Bossa is a development environment for operating-system process schedulers that provides numerous safety guarantees. In this paper, we show how to automate the checking of safety properties of a scheduling policy developed in this environment. We nd that most of the relevant properties can be considered as invariant or renement properties. In order to automate the related proof obligations, we use the WS1S logic for which a decision procedure is implemented by Mona. The proof techniques are implemented using the FMona tool.
Introduction
A Domain-Specic Language (DSL) is a language designed around the precise constructs and abstractions that are relevant to a specic domain [8] . Such a language captures domain expertise, guiding the programmer in the development of programs that are concise, high level, and expressed in terms of common domain abstractions. This technology has proved its value in easing program development in a variety of areas in both research and industry [16] .
In addition to easing the task of the programmer, DSL programs have the potential to be highly safe and ecient, because the language can be tuned to ease verication and optimization and because verication and optimization tools can be tuned to common domain idioms. Nevertheless, creating a verier or optimizer for a programming language remains a dicult task, which is further complicated in the case of DSLs by the need to start from scratch for each new language. A solution is to build on existing general-purpose verication and optimization tools, but there is little experience in this area. In this paper, we contribute to the understanding of this area by presenting a case study in using an existing verication tool to construct a verier for the Bossa DSL for implementing operating system (OS) process schedulers [17] .
Bossa. Process scheduling is an old problem, but there is no single scheduling policy that is perfect for all applications. Indeed, increasingly demanding applications in areas such as multimedia and embedded systems have motivated many new scheduling algorithms [10, 22, 23] . As these algorithms are not available in standard OSes, the developer of an application that requires a specic scheduling policy must implement it himself at the OS level. This is dicult and error-prone, requiring substantial expertise in the target OS.
To address this issue, we have developed the Bossa environment for developing operating system process schedulers [17] . Bossa provides two DSLs: a specication language for describing the scheduling requirements of a given OS and a programming language for implementing scheduling policies. Both languages oer abstractions dedicated to the scheduling domain, allowing OS scheduling behavior and scheduling policies to be described in a high-level and natural way. Bossa has been ported to Linux and Chorus [12] , and has been used in research [9] and teaching.
Bossa has a well-dened semantics and an ad-hoc verier [14] . The verier uses abstract interpretation to check that the specication of OS scheduling requirements is consistent and that a Bossa scheduling policy satises the specied requirements. The verication ensures that a scheduling policy considers as eligible for execution only those processes that are able to run. Some other properties are also checked, such as the absence of null-pointer dereferences. These checks ensure that a Bossa scheduler does not crash or hang the OS. Other properties, such as fairness and liveness could have been considered, but we have chosen to focus on properties relating to the interaction with the OS, as these are typically outside the expertise of the scheduling algorithm designer, and thus t well with the goal of DSLs to encapsulate expertise. This paper. As the Bossa verier is hand-crafted and mixes the encoding and checking of the relevant properties, we have found that it is hard to maintain, especially when extending the Bossa programming language. We have thus become interested in implementing the Bossa verications using an existing verication engine. Previously [5] , we have studied how the Bossa methodology could be considered within the B [1] formal method. This study showed that some of the verications made by Bossa could be expressed as proof obligations of B invariants or renements. However, most of these proof obligations were not discharged automatically by the provers available in atelier B [7] : a tool supporting the renement based B development method [1] . The reasons include the lack of suitable decision procedures and abstraction generators, particularly given the fact that the number of processes manipulated by a Bossa policy is unbounded. We thus needed a logic that could express Bossa properties in a natural way, to facilitate extension to new features, and a verication engine that would provide a decision procedure for this logic.
In this paper, we show that the WS1S logic, via the interface of the FMona tool [4] , is well-suited for expressing Bossa code and properties. A decision proce-dure for WS1S is provided by the Mona verication tool [13] . We can thus automatically verify all of the properties considered in our previous work, and cover other properties considered by the Bossa verier. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of Bossa and presents the associated verication problem in more detail. Section 3 introduces the tools and techniques that we use. Section 4 considers the verication of the specication of OS requirements. Section 5 presents the expression of scheduling policies and their verication with respect to the specication of OS requirements. Section 6 considers the relation between the verication methods that we use and some others. Section 7 concludes and presents some future work.
Bossa in a Nutshell
In this section, we give an overview of the Bossa DSLs, and then consider issues that arise in showing that a Bossa scheduling policy satises a specication.
The Bossa DSL for programming scheduling policies
A process scheduler is the part of an OS that is responsible for electing processes to have access to the CPU. To do this, it must keep track of the set of processes that are eligible for election and have a means of electing one of them. A scheduling policy describes the strategy taken by the scheduler in these operations. These operations are thus the focus of the constructs and abstractions provided by the Bossa DSL for programming scheduling policies.
Rate Monotonic (RM) [15] is a scheduling policy often used to manage periodic processes in real-time systems. When a process should be elected to have access to the CPU, this policy picks the eligible process with the shortest period. Figure 1 shows an extract of the Bossa implementation of this scheduling policy. The implementation declares the process attributes (line 2), the process states (lines 3-10), the ordering criteria (line 11) and the event handlers (lines 12-30). The process attributes record policy-specic information about each process. In the RM policy, this includes the process's period. The ordering criteria, which is only provided for priority-based policies, species the relative priority of processes. In the RM policy, this species that the process with the shortest period should be given the highest priority. We describe the process states and the event handlers in the rest of this section.
The RM policy denes six process states: running, ready, yield, blocked, computation_ended, and terminated. A process managed by the policy is always in exactly one of these states. Each process state is associated with a state class, which describes the eligibility of processes in the state. The state classes are as follows:
• RUNNING: active processes (at most one on a uniprocessor),
• READY: processes eligible for election,
• KERNEL_BLOCKED: processes that are ineligible due to their recent interaction with the OS (e.g., request for I/O), We describe the unblock.preemptive handler (lines [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] in detail, as it illustrates most of the language constructs. This handler is triggered when a process unblocks and the OS allows the scheduling policy to preempt the running process, if desired. The handler manipulates the process e.target, which is the process that is unblocking. It rst checks that this process is currently blocked (e.target in blocked, line 17) . If so, the handler changes the state of the unblocking process to ready (line 18) and then checks whether the running process should be preempted (line 19). For the latter, it tests whether there is a running process (!empty(running)) and whether the priority of the unblocking process is greater than that of the running process (e.target > running). If both conditions are satised, then the state of the running process is changed to ready, requesting that it be preempted.
The language also provides operations on integers and time, loops over queues, etc. It does not provide unbounded loops or recursive functions.
The Bossa DSL for specifying OS scheduling requirements
A scheduling policy must interact with the target OS at the lowest level. At this level, OSes vary widely, and thus the denition of a scheduling policy must be tuned to the target OS. Thus, the set of event handlers, the requirements on their behavior, and the possible interactions between them are not xed, but specied for each OS by an expert in the OS's process management behavior. This specication consists of a set of event types and an event automaton.
The event types describe the set of required event handlers and the requirements on their behavior. The latter are specied in terms of preconditions and postconditions on the states of relevant processes, such as the process generating the event (the source) or the process aected by the event (the target). Each event type rule describes a mapping of processes to states that can occur when the event is generated and the set of mappings of processes to states that are allowed on completion of the event handler. The specication is expressed in terms of the state classes, to be policy independent. As an example, the requirements on the block.* handler might be expressed as follows:
This rule species that when a process (tgt) blocks, it must be in a state of the RUNNING state class, and the handler must put the blocking process in a state of the KERNEL_BLOCKED state class, to record that the process is ineligible. This rule, however, is not sucient to capture the possible interactions between the scheduler and the OS that can occur in e.g. Linux 2.4. The appendix presents the more complex Linux 2.4 block.* event type.
The event automaton describes the sequences in which the OS generates the various events. For example, to terminate a process in Linux 2.4, the OS rst blocks the terminating process, then elects some other process, and eventually generates a process.end event to remove the process from the scheduler. Some sequences are uninterruptible; for example, Linux 2.4 always requests the election of a new process immediately after blocking a process, with no interruption possible between them. For the interruptible sequences, the OS expert also provides information about which events can occur during interrupts. The Bossa event type compiler augments the event automaton with all permutations of these events at each step in any interruptible sequence.
The Bossa verication problem
The Bossa verier applies various consistency checks to the OS specication and to scheduling policies. We describe these checks below.
For the OS specication, the main goal is to ensure that the event types are consistent. Bossa distinguishes between context sensitive and automatic events. Context-sensitive events occur only if the mapping of processes to states satises the preconditions of the corresponding event types. An example is unblocking, which originates at the OS level, where process states are known. There are no consistency requirements in this case. Automatic events occur regardless of the current mapping of processes to states. An example is blocking, which derives from actions at the user level where process states are unknown. Consistency requires that the event type specify at least one allowed behavior for each mapping of processes to states that can hold when the event occurs. To check this, the verier takes into account all possible sequences of events as specied by the event automaton, and all possible eects of the events along these sequences, as specied by the event type rules.
For a policy, the main goal is to ensure that the event handlers are well dened (e.g., no null-pointer dereferences) and that they respect the event types. In this, the verier uses the event types, instantiated according to the states dened by the policy, and the event automaton, to identify inter-handler eects. For each mapping of processes to states that is allowed by the event types and reachable according to the event automaton, the verier analyzes each execution path through the event handler to determine the eect on the process states. The resulting mapping of processes to states must be compatible with the postconditions specied by the event type rules. This part of the verier has been presented in detail previously [14] .
Both forms of verication rely on analysis of all possible execution paths, suggesting that model checking would be appropriate. Standard model checking techniques, however, are limited to nite state spaces. In the case of Bossa, the size of the state space is determined by the number of processes, which in general is not bounded. We thus turn to the Mona tool [13] , which is able to reason in the presence of unknown integer values.
The Mona verication tool
We rst review the Mona tool [13] and then describe transition systems, properties, and verication techniques in this setting.
Mona
Mona implements a decision procedure for the logic WS1S, dened as follows:
Denition 1 (The WS1S logic) Let {x 1 , . . . , x n } be a set of rst-order variables and {X 1 , . . . , X n } a set of second-order variables. A minimal grammar for the WS1S logic as follows:
• a term t is dened by: t ::= 0 | x i | s(t), where s is the successor symbol.
• a formula f is dened by: 1st and 2nd order quantication) A closed formula is WS1S valid if its interpretation over the set N of natural numbers is valid. First-order variables denote natural numbers and second-order variables denote nite subsets of N. The logic is decidable.
To express properties relevant to Bossa, we use the FMona [4] high-level interface for Mona. This interface allows declaring enumerated types, records with updates, quantication over nite structured types, and parameterized higher-order macros. FMona code is automatically translated into Mona.
As an example, we consider the denition of a notion similar to superposition [6] . We suppose that we have an automaton, the states of which are identied by the Location type, and a relation tr over the data type Data. 
Partial application is possible. For example, if l1 and l2 are locations, then superpose(tr,l1,l2) is a predicate over pairs of the superposed type. Type parameters are automatically synthesized.
Transition systems and properties
We dene a transition system as a triple composed of a state space, an initialisation predicate and a binary transition relation. In our case, systems are parameterized by the number of processes. Mona can analyze properties of such systems even if the parameter has not been instantiated, which is the essential advantage of Mona over traditional model checking in our context. In this paper, we consider safety properties expressed as invariants. Following Mona terminology, we do not distinguish between a property and a predicate.
Denition 2 (Invariant) A predicate P is said to be invariant with respect to a transition system if it is true in the transition system's initial states and is preserved by its transition relation.
Invariance properties rely on stability and do not consider actual executions. When invariance cannot be established, we can consider a weaker property: the predicate always true [19] 
Verication techniques
We use renement to prove that a concrete specication is correct with respect to an abstract specication, abstraction to prove that a property holds in a concrete system, and iteration to calculate xed points. We recall the denitions of renement and abstraction, and show how iterative techniques are implemented within FMona.
Denition 4 (Renement) A transition system S c (said to be concrete) renes a transition system S a (said to be abstract) if there exists a relation ϕ between the states of the concrete transition system and the states of the abstract one such that:
• Each initial state of the concrete transition system is related by ϕ to an initial state of the abstract transition system.
• Given a concrete state c and an abstract state a related by ϕ, then for each element c' related to c by the concrete transition relation, there exists an element a' related to a by the abstract transition relation. The implementation of iterative techniques. Most of the temporal properties that we are interested in can be expressed as xed points [2] . However, since we do not have general decidability results for reaching the xed point, we must provide a bound on the number of iterations required to reach it. The macro backward is parameterized by the number of iterations N , the transition system dened by the predicates init and tr and the predicate to verify inv. Starting from a state characterized by the negation of inv, after n iterations (through the recursive macro iterate) of the inverse of the transition relation, we check that a xed point has actually been reached (through the stable predicate) without reaching any initial state. In this way, we verify that a path between an initial state and a state satisfying ¬inv does not exist. 
Translation of the event types
We represent a Bossa state class by the set of processes associated with it. To simplify the FMona code generation, the processes occurring on the left side of a rule are always subtracted from every state class. This approach is mainly useful when the left hand side contains a disjunction of lters, as it is then unnecessary to examine them separately. The FMona code is verbose, but does not need to be simplied since Mona generates an equivalent automaton-based internal representation for all equivalent formulas.
• block_, which is the disjunction of the transitions Eblock_ for any possible values of src and tgt.
pred block_(var Classes s,s') = ex Proc src, tgt: Eblock_(src,tgt,s,s');
Verication of intra-event properties
The event type should not allow a scheduling policy to put a process in more than one state, to put multiple processes in the state of the RUNNING state class, or to drop processes. These properties are straightforwardly encoded as invariant properties or as the preservation of a state expression.
Verication of inter-event properties
The sequencing of events is described by the Bossa event automaton. Within this automaton, Bossa distinguishes between automatic events and context-sensitive events. The event types must be constructed such that at every point in the automaton where an automatic event appears, the state of the system obtained by every path to that point is compatible with at least one of the preconditions indicated by the event's type.
To check this property, we must take into account the complete dynamics of the system. This is represented by the combination of the event automaton, the event types, and the system state (Classes) to describe the mapping of processes to state classes before and after each event. The resulting transition relation is dened on the state space NClasses: The transition relation itself, NNext, is dened by superposing the relations describing the event types (block_, etc.) to the transitions in the event automaton. The disjunction of the representations of the event types for the events occurring in interrupts is superposed to automata states that represent interruptible points in the event sequences. The representations of the remaining type rules are superposed to the corresponding automaton transitions. Our goal is to check that every reachable state of the system satises the preconditions of the automatic events allowed from this state. However, computing the reachable states of the system cannot be automatic in general because the state space is parameterized by the number of processes. Thus, we use a nite abstraction of the state space where a boolean is associated to each class indicating whether the class is empty (false value) or not. The abstraction relation between the state space of classes and its abstraction AClasses contains the representation invariant inv (4.2) and the denition of each boolean eld:
The predicate nabs extends the abstraction relation to the state space of the superposed automaton. It takes as argument a concrete value of type NClasses and an abstract value of type NAClasses, and maps state locations to themselves and abstracts the process sets attached to each class to booleans. The satisfaction of preconditions can now be expressed at the abstract level: each concrete counterpart of an abstract state must satisfy the preconditions of automatic events. We rst introduce a predicate check_pre over concrete states of type NClasses, asserting that the guards of automatic events allowed by the automaton at the current state are satised. The abstract level predicate check(var NAClasses a) expresses that all the concretisations of a through nabs satisfy check_pre.
Backward analysis of the abstract system, which terminates here after one step, veries this property on each reachable abstract state and thus on a superset of the reachable concrete states. Given macros AInit and ANext that compute the abstraction of the initialisation and the transition relation of the concrete system, the property is checked by the following assertion:
backward(1, ANext(NNext,nabs), AInit(NInit,nabs),check);
Remarks
• This study revealed an error in the abstraction of the behaviour of the Linux kernel as described by Bossa event types. The analysis performed by Bossa tools did not detect the error because it performs a less accurate analysis: it considers an abstraction of state classes using three values (empty, nonempty, unknown), and no verications are performed on unknown states.
• Even if it is theoretically possible to compute the set of reachable states of the abstract system, its computational complexity makes doing so hard. This is why we have applied an iterative method. Its convergence is however guaranteed because the abstract state space is nite, even though the transitions are parameterized by the number of processes.
• The analysis performed here amounts to model checking, but because the transition relations over the state space NAClasses are parameterized, a nite-state model checker is not directly applicable. The use of a nite state model checker would require a program transformation, which is usually hard to validate. In our proposal, abstraction is specied at the semantic level. The correctness of the method relies on a simple meta-level theorem. The translation of event handlers to FMona relies on a weakest precondition calculus over the Bossa statements. An abstraction of subexpressions that cannot be translated into FMona (arithmetic expressions, etc.) is also performed. State updates and emptiness checks are preserved.
Bossa event handlers can be partially dened. For example, it is only allowed to put a process in a state designated as a process variable if the state is empty. In order to guarantee the wellformedness of event handlers, preconditions are generated in such cases. For example, in the following handler, because the state yield is implemented as a variable (see Figure 1, line 6) , the transition to yield is only valid if yield is empty:
On yield.user.* { e.target => yield; } The FMona translation of this handler includes the condition yield=∅ which, when not satised, blocks the transition. We will prove that this cannot occur. 
Verication of a policy
We now show how to use FMona to express the conformance of a policy with the event types. This property is based on the existence of a renement relation between transitions over the Classes type, said to be abstract, and transitions over the Bstates type, said to be concrete. It amounts to instantiating the event type rules, which are dened in terms of state classes, with respect to the states dened by a given policy.
The generic renement property for preconditioned transitions (used here) is instantiated and expressed as a predicate over the concrete type: This renement property, however, is not usually valid. For example, a transition towards the yield state is only possible if this state is empty. As the event type does not require the associated state class READY to be empty, there is no renement. We must thus take into account executions allowed by the automaton and only check the renement on concrete states of type Bstates of which a given abstraction is reachable. This abstraction is obtained by representing each state by a boolean that is true if the state is not empty. The concrete and abstract states are superposed to those of the automaton. The renement property is then veried for all concrete counterparts of reachable abstract states. Only allowed transitions from a given state are taken into account. In our case, convergence was obtained after three backward applications of the abstract transition. In general, the convergence of the iterative method is ensured because the abstract state space is nite. The size of the state space can, however, be much larger than the number of iterations required (640 vs. 3 in the case of the RM policy).
Related work
In this paper, we have automated the proof of Bossa scheduler properties using the WS1S logic and Mona. It is interesting to remark that, although the worst-case complexity of this logic is non-elementary, the computations required by the considered scheduling structures seem to be feasible. This conrms the results obtained for other domains, such as the static analysis of data structures [11] and software structures [21] .
Other methods and proof techniques could have been used. Concerning methods, we mention the B method, which we have used in our previous study [5] . Nevertheless, the approach presented here requires some features that are not supported by B, namely taking into account the event automaton and the use of abstractions. Our use of these features widened the set of properties that could be expressed, while remaining within WS1S logic. This, in turn, allowed the proof obligations to be discharged automatically.
Concerning proof techniques, states could have been represented by counters. Since Mona implements Presburger arithmetic, Mona could have been used. However tools dedicated to arithmetic such as FAST [3] should be more ecient. The use of the WS1S logic allowed us to avoid abstracting sets as counters. Petri nets [20] could also have been used. Although the use of counters is restricted in this case, it should be possible to elaborate models. In both cases, the considered properties cannot be decided automatically and require either making abstractions or applying convergence accelerations.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown how to use Mona to check Bossa properties that were previously checked by specic tools. This approach separates the generation of proof obligations, which remains Bossa-specic, from the construction of the associated proofs, which is performed by a generic tool. Because the generation of proof obligations is much simpler than proof construction, this approach should make it easier to extend and modify the Bossa verier as the needs of the language evolve. Extensions can furthermore transparently use features of the automated prover that were not built into the Bossa verier, such as reasoning about integers. Nevertheless, while this study considers the safety properties checked by the Bossa verier, it does not address some properties that are used by the Bossa compiler to generate optimized code. For this, a stronger coupling between Bossa and FMona is needed.
Using a general purpose verier may seem potentially less ecient than a verier dedicated to Bossa. Nevertheless, there has been substantial research dedicated to improving the eciency of general-purpose provers, which goes beyond what is typically available for developing tools for a domain-specic language. In practice, we have observed that our approach gives the same performance as the Bossa verier, around one minute to verify a typical scheduling policy. In particular, our use of iterative techniques, which avoid second-order quantication, greatly improves both the execution time and memory usage.
The Bossa verier checks properties related to the scheduling requirements of the OS. Using our approach, properties concerning the scheduling algorithm and the scheduled application can now also be considered. For instance, does the implementation of a scheduler satisfy a given property? And will an application meet its deadlines under a given scheduler? Finally, the generation of certied code as well as proof annotated code [18] could be considered.
